Civil Procedure: Pre-Trial & Trial by Colleluori, Donald et al.
SMU Annual Texas Survey
Volume 1 Article 4
2014
Civil Procedure: Pre-Trial & Trial
Donald Colleluori
Figari & Davenport, L.L.P.
Gary D. Eisenstat
Figari & Davenport, L.L.P.
Bill E. Davidoff
Figari & Davenport, L.L.P.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smuatxs
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Annual Texas
Survey by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Donald Colleluori, et al., Civil Procedure: Pre-Trial & Trial, 1 SMU Ann. Tex. Surv. (2014)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smuatxs/vol1/iss1/4
 101 
CIVIL PROCEDURE: PRE-TRIAL & TRIAL 
Donald Colleluori* 
Gary D. Eisenstat** 
Bill E. Davidoff*** 
The major developments in the field of civil procedure during the Survey 
period occurred through judicial decisions. 
I.  SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION 
In recent years, the Texas Supreme Court’s docket has been crowded with 
cases raising issues of subject matter jurisdiction. This trend continued during 
the Survey period. In Rusk State Hospital v. Black,1 the supreme court reaffirmed 
the principle that governmental immunity from suit implicates a trial court’s 
subject matter jurisdiction.2 Accordingly, a court of appeals can consider the 
immunity defense even if it is raised for the first time on interlocutory appeal 
under Section 51.014(a) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.3 Although 
that statute creates an exception to the general rule allowing appeals only from 
final judgment and is therefore strictly construed, the supreme court reasoned it 
could not be construed so as to effectively “require appellate courts to address 
the merits of cases without regard to whether the courts have jurisdiction.”4 
In reaching its decision, the majority recognized (but declined to address) the 
argument that saying governmental immunity “implicates” subject matter 
jurisdiction does not necessarily “equate” to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
for all purposes.5 In a partial dissent, however, Justice Lehrmann was not so 
reticent.6 Her dissent argued that immunity is properly understood as 
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 1. Rusk State Hosp. v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88 (Tex. 2013). 
 2. Id. at 95. 
 3. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a) (West 2009); see Black, 392 S.W.3d at 
95. 
 4. Black, 392 S.W.3d at 95. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 102 (Lehrmann, J., concurring and dissenting). The majority described the dissent as 
advocating a “change in the nature of immunity in Texas,” which it acknowledged was an 
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implicating both subject matter and personal jurisdiction, and because a party’s 
objection to the latter can be waived (unlike a lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction), governmental entities should be required to raise their immunity 
defense in the trial court.7 The dissent pointed out the significant consequences 
of equating immunity with a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, specifically that 
it would allow a governmental entity (or the plaintiff suing it for that matter) to 
litigate a case to conclusion and, if dissatisfied with the result, simply attack the 
judgment as void after the fact.8 Given the seriousness of the dissent’s concern, 
it seems likely that the supreme court will have to address this issue again soon 
in another case where it has been properly raised and briefed. 
After raising the issue itself, the Texas Supreme Court concluded that the 
plaintiff homeowners had standing to challenge administrative interpretations 
issued by the Finance and Credit Union Commissions pursuant to their 
authority under the 2003 amendment to the constitutional provision governing 
home equity loans in Texas.9 Although the challenged interpretations were not 
in effect when the homeowners had secured their own home equity loans, and 
they did not specifically allege that they intended to acquire new loans, plaintiffs 
argued that the potential interference with their prospective interest in future 
home equity loans was sufficient to establish standing. The supreme court 
agreed.10 The court focused on the unique circumstances of the home equity 
amendment’s safe-harbor provision that protects lenders who comply with the 
Commissions’ interpretations.11 Thus, the applicable interpretations could not 
injure a home equity borrower because the constitutional provision deemed the 
lender’s compliance with those interpretations lawful.12 The only injury that 
could be redressed, therefore, was the injury to a party’s interest in obtaining a 
future home equity loan unimpaired by the Commissions’ alleged 
misinterpretations.13 Under these circumstances, the supreme court seemingly 
relaxed the ordinary requirement that a plaintiff show a concrete and 
particularized injury.14 Indeed, the court suggested that even a homeowner who 
did not intend to apply for a new loan suffered an injury as well because of the 
Commissions’ misinterpretations.15 The opinion makes clear, however, that the 
home equity provision at issue “create[d] an exceptional context in which to 
assess standing,”16 and it is doubtful whether litigants can extend the supreme 
court’s reasoning to establish standing for plaintiffs claiming this type of passive 
injury in other cases. 
Standing in the class action context was at issue in Heckman v. Williamson 
 
important issue but was unnecessary to its decision and had not been raised by the parties. Id. at 97. 
 7. Id. at 104–08. 
 8. Id. at 107–08. 
 9. Fin. Comm’n of Tex. v. Norwood, 418 S.W.3d 566, 584 (Tex. 2013). 
 10. Id. at 582–83. 
 11. Id. at 581. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 583. 
 15. Id. at 583–84. 
 16. Id. at 584. 
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County.17 The court of appeals had dismissed the case for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction because “not one of the named plaintiffs had standing to pursue all 
of the putative class’s claims.”18 The Texas Supreme Court reversed, requiring 
only that at least one named plaintiff have standing for each claim asserted in the 
case.19 The supreme court noted that this is the consensus rule in the federal 
courts, and it follows logically from the fundamental principle that courts must 
analyze the standing of each individual plaintiff to bring each individual claim.20 
The fact that the named plaintiff also seeks to represent a class should not 
increase his burden to establish standing.21 
II.  SPECIAL APPEARANCE 
In Moncrief Oil International, Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, the Texas Supreme Court 
elaborated on the type of evidence that will or will not be sufficient to establish 
that a non-resident has the requisite minimum contacts for personal 
jurisdiction.22 The plaintiff there alleged that the defendants misappropriated 
trade secrets that were disclosed to them in Texas and tortiously interfered with 
the plaintiff’s existing and prospective business relationships by using those 
trade secrets to compete. Noting that “specific jurisdiction requires us to analyze 
jurisdictional contacts on a claim-by-claim basis,”23 the supreme court first held 
that the defendants’ attendance at two meetings in Texas where the trade secrets 
were allegedly disclosed to them was sufficient to show that they had 
purposefully availed themselves of doing business in Texas.24 The supreme court 
brushed away the defendants’ argument that their only purpose in coming to 
Texas was to discuss settlement of a separate dispute, explaining that at the 
jurisdictional phase, the relevant inquiry is the defendants’ actual business 
contacts with the state and not what they thought or intended.25 
Conversely, the supreme court also held that the special appearance evidence 
was insufficient to establish specific jurisdiction as to the tortious interference 
claim.26 This claim focused on the defendants’ alleged attempt to convince a 
third party not to proceed in a joint venture with the plaintiff, as well as their 
establishment of a competing enterprise in Texas. Even though the defendants’ 
original receipt of the plaintiff’s claimed trade secrets was a necessary predicate 
to the interference claim, the supreme court held that “but-for causation alone is 
insufficient” and that the interference claim was centered on discussions 
between the defendants and the third party that occurred in California.27 Since 
 
 17. Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137 (Tex. 2012). 
 18. Id. at 150 (emphasis original). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. at 151–53. 
 21. Id. at 153–54. 
 22. Moncrief Oil Int’l, Inc. v. OAO Gazprom, 414 S.W.3d 142 (Tex. 2013). 
 23. Id. at 150. 
 24. Id. at 154. 
 25. Id. The supreme court also rejected the defendants’ argument that the information they 
received at the meetings was not truly trade secret, noting that this went to the merits of the 
plaintiff’s claim and not personal jurisdiction. Id. at 156, n.15. 
 26. Id. at 156. 
 27. Id. at 157. 
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the competing enterprise in Texas was a separate legal entity, and the plaintiff 
did not establish that it was the defendants’ alter ego, these facts also failed to 
support the exercise of specific jurisdiction.28 
Texas courts continue to grapple with the effect of e-commerce on traditional 
personal jurisdiction principles. In a case of first impression in Texas, the Dallas 
Court of Appeals rejected an attempt to ground jurisdiction on the choice of law 
and forum selection clauses from a document that was available on the 
plaintiff’s website and referred to in the contract documents.29 The court of 
appeals explained that, although the document was referred to in the parties’ 
agreement, it was not specifically incorporated by reference.30 Nor did the 
agreement plainly state that the referenced document contained additional 
terms and conditions or was otherwise intended to become part of the contract; 
instead, it suggested that the document contained “informative material only.”31 
III.  VENUE 
In In re Lopez,32 the Texas Supreme Court was asked to determine the 
appropriate county for a motion to vacate an arbitration award when the 
hearing has been held in a different county than the one designated in the 
parties’ agreement. Here, the arbitration agreement provided that “[t]he 
arbitration hearing and all related proceedings shall be conducted in Victoria 
County, Texas, unless otherwise agreed upon.”33 The parties decided to hold the 
arbitration hearing in Travis County instead. Afterwards, the losing party filed 
an application to vacate the arbitration award in Victoria County. It argued that 
venue was mandatory in Victoria County under Section 171.096(b) of the Texas 
Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which states that if an arbitration agreement 
“provides that the hearing before the arbitrators is to be held in a county in this 
state, a party must file the initial application [to vacate the arbitration award] 
with the clerk of the court of that county.”34 The prevailing parties, however, 
argued that venue was mandatory in Travis County under Section 171.096(c) of 
the same code, which states that “if a hearing before the arbitrators has been 
held, a party must file the initial application [to vacate the arbitration award] 
with the clerk of the court of the county in which the hearing was held.”35 The 
supreme court concluded that because the latter provision speaks specifically to 
the situation in which the hearing has already occurred, it should control, and 
the court required that the motion to vacate be filed in the same county where 
the arbitration hearing had been held.36 
 
 28. Id. 
 29. Bob Montgomery Chevrolet, Inc. v. Dent Zone Cos., 409 S.W.3d 181, 193 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2013, no pet.). 
 30. Id. at 190. 
 31. Id. 
 32. In re Lopez, 372 S.W.3d 174 (Tex. 2012). 
 33. Id. at 175. 
 34. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM CODE ANN. § 171.096(b) (West 2009). 
 35. Id. § 171.096(c). 
 36. Lopez, 372 S.W.3d at 176. 
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IV.  PARTIES 
The Texas Supreme Court once again addressed the differences between 
misnomer and misidentification in Reddy Partnership/5900 North Freeway, LP v. 
Harris County Appraisal District.37 In this property tax case, the Harris County 
Appraisal District (HCAD) mailed a Notice of Appraised Value of Property to 
“Reddy Partnership, ETAL.” A notice of protest was filed by Reddy Partnership, 
ETAL and rejected by the HCAD’s appraisal review board. Subsequently, Reddy 
Partnership, ETAL petitioned for judicial review to challenge the board’s 
determination. Fifteen months later, after the statute of limitations to appeal the 
board’s order had expired, HCAD contended that the trial court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction because “Reddy Partnership, ETAL” was not the owner of 
the property and, therefore, lacked standing. Reddy Partnership, ETAL 
amended its petition to name Reddy Partnership/5900 North Freeway, LP as 
the plaintiff and owner of the property, alleging that it had not properly 
identified itself in the original petition. “The trial court granted HCAD’s 
jurisdictional plea and dismissed the suit. . . . The court of appeals affirmed, 
holding that because the suit had not been filed by the property owner, the trial 
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.” 
The supreme court first discussed the differences between the doctrines of 
misidentification and misnomer. “Misnomer arises when a party misnames itself 
or another party, but the correct parties are [actually] involved” in the suit.38 In 
contrast, misidentification “arises when two separate legal entities actually exist 
and a plaintiff mistakenly sues the entity with a name similar to that of the 
correct entity.”39 The court noted that there are harsh consequences for 
misidentification but not for misnomer.40 Instead, trial courts generally should 
allow plaintiffs to correct their pleadings when they have misnamed but sued the 
correct defendant.41 The supreme court held that in cases like this, where the 
plaintiff has misnamed itself, the rationale for flexibility that governs in the 
typical misnomer case “applies with even greater force.”42 
V.  PLEADINGS 
In John C. Flood of DC, Inc. v. SuperMedia, LLC,43 the Dallas Court of Appeals 
analyzed the concepts of “standing” and “capacity.” In this case, the plaintiff 
filed suit for breach of contract and quantum meruit to collect amounts allegedly 
due for advertising services. The defendants filed a general denial and further 
asserted that the plaintiff lacked the capacity to sue and that the defendants were 
not liable in the capacity in which they were sued. However, the defendants did 
 
 37. Reddy P’ship/5900 N. Fwy, LP v. Harris Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 370 S.W.3d 373 (Tex. 
2012). 
 38. Id. at 376 (internal quotations omitted). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 41. Id. at 377. 
 42. Id. 
 43. John C. Flood of DC, Inc. v. SuperMedia, LLC, 408 S.W.3d 645 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, 
pet. denied). 
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not verify their answer as required by Rule 93(1).44 The plaintiff subsequently 
moved for summary judgment, and one hour prior to the hearing on plaintiff’s 
motion, the defendants filed an amended answer that included a verified denial 
alleging that plaintiff lacked capacity to sue and that the defendants were not 
liable in the capacity in which they were sued. The trial court granted summary 
judgment and the defendants appealed. 
On appeal, the defendants argued that the plaintiff had failed to establish it 
had standing because it was neither a direct party nor a third party beneficiary 
under the contract at issue. The court of appeals initially noted that the 
defendants had confused the concepts of standing and capacity.45 “A plaintiff 
has standing when it is personally aggrieved, regardless of whether it is acting 
with legal authority; a party has capacity when it has the legal authority to act, 
regardless of whether it has a judiciable interest in the controversy.”46 Unlike 
standing, a litigant can waive its claim that an opposing party does not have the 
capacity to participate in a suit.47 Here, the issue was not whether the plaintiff 
had standing to bring the suit, but instead whether it could recover in the 
capacity in which it sued. 
Based on the foregoing, the court then analyzed whether the defendants had 
waived their capacity argument because their verified denial was untimely. The 
court explained that it will generally presume the trial court granted leave to file 
a late pleading, even though the filer did not request leave, when: “(1) the record 
fails to show that the trial court did not consider the amended pleading; and (2) 
there is not a sufficient showing of surprise or prejudice on the part of the 
opposing party.”48 However, that presumption does not apply when the 
judgment does not affirmatively state that the trial court considered all the 
pleadings on file.49 Here, because the final judgment stated that the trial court 
considered all the pleadings “timely filed,” the court of appeals concluded that 
the amended answer was not considered and affirmed the summary judgment.50 
VI.  DISCOVERY 
Discovery sanctions continued to be a frequent topic in the case law during 
the Survey period. In JNS Enterprise, Inc. v. Dixie Demolition, LLC,51 for example, 
the Austin Court of Appeals upheld the imposition of death-penalty sanctions 
against plaintiffs who the trial court found had fabricated back-dated contracts 
and a performance guarantee that formed the basis of their claims, and then 
testified falsely about the documents in their depositions.52 The court of appeals 
 
 44. TEX. R. CIV. P. 93(1) (requiring that a pleading denying legal capacity be verified by 
affidavit). 
 45. Flood, 408 S.W.3d at 651. 
 46. Id. at 650 (emphasis original). 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 654 (citing Goswami v. Metro Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 751 S.W.2d 487, 490 (Tex. 
1988)). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 654–55. 
 51. JNS Enter., Inc. v. Dixie Demolition, LLC, 430 S.W.3d 444 (Tex. App.—Austin, no pet.). 
 52. Id. at 447. 
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quickly dispatched the plaintiffs’ argument that the lack of a prior order 
compelling discovery or imposing lesser sanctions meant that imposition of 
death-penalty sanctions was impermissible. The court stated that the nature of 
the sanctionable conduct was such that it could not be corrected by a court 
order, and less severe orders could not effectively address or punish the 
conduct.53 While the court correctly recognized that Texas law does not always 
require that lesser sanctions first be tested (only that they be considered)54 the 
opinion’s discussion of why such lesser sanctions could not have been effective is 
fairly superficial. Instead, the court’s focus remained fixed on the particularly 
egregious nature of the misconduct involved. In effect, the court was saying that 
only this punishment fits the crime the plaintiffs committed.55 Perhaps, not 
surprisingly, other courts have agreed that if anything justifies the immediate 
imposition of death-penalty sanctions, it is this type of fabrication of evidence 
and attempted corruption of the judicial process.56 
The Texarkana Court of Appeals shot down a novel attempt to rely on the 
“apex deposition” doctrine57 in In re Titus County.58 Titus County initiated an 
eminent domain proceeding to acquire property owned by a real estate company 
and William D. Priefert, individually and as trustee. Priefert was also the chief 
executive officer of the corporate defendant. When the County sought his 
deposition, Priefert invoked the apex doctrine and submitted an affidavit stating 
that he did not have personal or unique knowledge about the properties and 
arguing that the County should be required to first depose the company’s chief 
financial officer. The court of appeals rejected Priefert’s argument, explaining 
that the apex doctrine does not automatically protect high-ranking corporate 
officers in every case, but instead applies when they are noticed for deposition 
solely because of their corporate position.59 In addition, the doctrine does not 
apply to preclude the deposition of a named party.60 Therefore, even if Priefert 
could avail himself of the apex protection in his role as chief executive officer, 
he would still be subject to a deposition as one of the landowners and a party to 
the condemnation claim.61 
 
 53. Id. at 453. 
 54. Id. at 456. 
 55. Id. (“[T]he offensive conduct—i.e., fabricating the evidence necessary to support its claims—
trumpets that [plaintiffs’] claims lack merit.”). 
 56. Id. at 456–57 (citing Daniel v. Kelley Oil Corp., 981 S.W.2d 230, 235 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied); First Nat’l Bank of La. v. Lustig, 96 F.3d 1554, 1573 (5th 
Cir. 1996)); see also Gunn v. Fuqua, 397 S.W.3d 358, 375 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied) 
(‘“Death penalty’ sanctions are appropriate as an initial sanction only in the egregious and 
exceptional case when they are ‘clearly justified and it is fully apparent that no lesser sanctions 
would promote compliance with the rules.’”) (quoting GTE Commc’ns Sys. Corp. v. Tanner, 856 
S.W.2d 725, 729 (Tex. 1993)). 
 57. The term “apex” deposition refers to the deposition of a corporate party’s president or 
similar high-ranking official. See Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Garcia, 904 S.W.2d 125, 127 
(Tex. 1995). To prevent such depositions from being used as a litigation tactic merely to harass a 
corporate defendant or apply settlement pressure, the Texas Supreme Court has developed 
guidelines for when and how such depositions may be taken. Id. at 128. 
 58. In re Titus Cnty., 412 S.W.3d 28 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, no pet.). 
 59. Id. at 35. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
108 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 1 
A request for a pre-suit deposition of the Comptroller of Public Accounts 
under Rule 20262 was at issue in Combs v. The Texas Civil Rights Project.63 The 
Austin Court of Appeals rejected the Comptroller’s argument that the Rule 202 
petition was an independent suit that was barred by sovereign immunity.64 The 
court went on to explain, however, that a pre-suit deposition cannot “be used 
solely to investigate potential claims that are otherwise barred by sovereign 
immunity.”65 Examining the plaintiffs’ pleadings, the court of appeals concluded 
that although the alleged conduct by the Comptroller would fall within the ultra 
vires exception to sovereign immunity, such conduct would not support a claim 
for retrospective relief (such as damages), and the plaintiffs’ pleadings and the 
Comptroller’s evidence negated the possibility of an award of any type of 
prospective relief.66 Accordingly, the court vacated the order granting the Rule 
202 petition and dismissed the cause for lack of jurisdiction.67 
Finally, the Texas Supreme Court provided guidance on what it termed the 
“allied litigant” privilege in In re XL Specialty Insurance Co.68 In this suit against a 
workers’ compensation carrier, the injured employee sought discovery of 
communications that passed between the insured employer and the carrier’s 
outside counsel during the administrative proceeding. The supreme court held 
that those communications were not privileged under Texas law.69 The court 
explained that, unlike what is often called the “common interest” privilege, 
Texas Rule of Evidence 503(b)(1)(c)70 protects only communications between a 
client (or her lawyer) and the lawyer for another party made in the context of a 
pending action.71 Although the privilege is potentially available to all parties to 
an action and not just defendants (hence the label “allied litigant” rather than 
“joint defense”), it does not extend to communications made in furtherance of 
joint or common interests outside of litigation.72 
In the case before it, the supreme court concluded that the allied litigant 
privilege did not apply because the employer was neither represented by the 
insurer’s attorney nor a party to the action.73 The opinion recognizes, however, 
that the workers’ compensation scenario is unusual because suit is brought 
directly against the insurer and not the insured employer.74 The supreme court 
noted that the result may well be different in the more typical situation where an 
insurer-retained counsel represents the insured in litigation and also 
communicates with the insurer that pays the bills.75 In the latter situation, the 
 
 62. TEX. R. CIV. P. 202. 
 63. Combs v. The Tex. Civil Rights Project, 410 S.W.3d 529 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, pet. 
denied). 
 64. Id. at 534. 
 65. Id. at 535 (citations omitted). 
 66. Id. at 537–38. 
 67. Id. at 538–49. 
 68. In re XL Specialty Ins. Co., 373 S.W.3d 46 (Tex. 2012). 
 69. Id. at 56. 
 70. TEX. R. EVID. 503(b)(1)(c). 
 71. XL Specialty, 373 S.W.3d at 51–52. 
 72. Id. at 52. 
 73. Id. at 53. 
 74. Id. at 54. 
 75. Id. 
2014] Civil Procedure: Pre-Trial & Trial 109 
retained lawyer might be found to represent both the insurer and the insured,76 
or the insurer might be deemed a “representative” of the insured client within 
the meaning of Rule 503 based on its right to retain counsel and control the 
litigation.77 
VII.  DISMISSAL 
The Texas Supreme Court in CTL/Thompson Texas, LLC v. Starwood 
Homeowner’s Association, Inc.78 held that a plaintiff’s nonsuit during an appeal of 
an action under Texas Civil Practices & Remedies Code § 150.002(f)79 would 
not moot the defendant’s appeal of the trial court’s refusal to dismiss that action 
with prejudice.80 Suits for professional negligence against licensed engineers or 
architects must be accompanied by an expert’s affidavit opining as to the claim’s 
merits.81 If a plaintiff fails to comply with this requirement, the trial court must 
dismiss the action, but that dismissal may be with or without prejudice.82 Here, 
after the plaintiff filed its suit, the defendant moved to dismiss, claiming that the 
plaintiff’s supporting affidavit was deficient. The trial court denied the motion, 
and the defendant filed an interlocutory appeal. Before the court of appeals 
could rule, the plaintiff nonsuited the action. The appellate court then 
dismissed the appeal as moot. The supreme court reversed, however, holding 
that the defendant’s request for a dismissal with prejudice constituted a request 
for affirmative relief that should survive the nonsuit, just as a defendant’s 
request for sanctions survives a nonsuit.83 
In Roberts v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,84 the trial court sent a letter to counsel 
advising it had granted a motion for partial summary judgment and requesting 
that an order be prepared reflecting that ruling. The plaintiff then nonsuited the 
case before the court actually signed an order. The El Paso Court of Appeals 
held that this nonsuit did not preclude the trial court from subsequently 
entering an order dismissing the plaintiff’s claims with prejudice.85 While a 
plaintiff has an absolute right of nonsuit under Rule 16286 prior to the 
introduction of his evidence at trial, the act of signing a judgment that the trial 
court had already rendered was merely administrative; thus, the plaintiff’s 
nonsuit could not preclude the trial court from effectuating its order.87 
 
 76. Id. at 54–55. The supreme court reaffirmed that whether the insurer and the insured are 
joint clients of the lawyer is a matter of contract between the parties. Id. at 55 (citing Unauthorized 
Practice of Law Comm. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 261 S.W.3d 24, 42 (Tex. 2008)). 
 77. Id. at 55 (citing TEX. R. EVID. 503(a)(2)). 
 78. CTL/Thompson Tex., LLC v. Starwood Homeowner’s Ass’n, Inc., 390 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. 
2013). 
 79. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 150.002(f). 
 80. CTL/Thompson, 390 S.W.3d at 300. 
 81. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 150.002(a). 
 82. Id. § 150.002(e). 
 83. CTL/Thompson, 390 S.W.3d at 300–01. 
 84. Roberts v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 406 S.W.3d 702 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2013, no pet.). 
 85. Id. at 706. 
 86. TEX. R. CIV. P. 162. 
 87. Roberts, 406 S.W.3d at 706. 
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VIII.  JURY PRACTICE 
In In re Frank Kent Motor Co., the Texas Supreme Court conditionally granted 
a writ of mandamus to enforce a jury waiver in the employment context.88 The 
supreme court held that the employer’s alleged threat to terminate an at-will 
employee for not signing a jury waiver did not constitute coercion and would 
not, therefore, invalidate the waiver.89 The court reasoned that because the 
employer had the right to terminate the employee at any time, the actual or 
threatened exercise of that legitimate right would not void the waiver.90 
Analogizing to employment arbitration agreements, which courts have held may 
also be enforced in the at-will context, the supreme court found no reason to 
treat jury waivers differently.91 
In BNSF Railway Co. v. Wipff, the Fort Worth Court of Appeals addressed 
whether a trial court erred in denying a request to shuffle a jury panel that was 
made after the jurors had completed a questionnaire “under penalty of 
perjury.”92 Although the trial court had denied the defendant’s request to 
shuffle the panel as untimely because counsel had already received and reviewed 
the questionnaire, the court of appeals rejected that conclusion because the trial 
court had not yet delivered the instructions to the jury as required under Rule 
226a.93 The appellate court then determined that the trial court’s failure to 
shuffle the jury was both presumed and proved harmful, as the defendant 
showed that it had seated two objectionable jurors that it would have otherwise 
struck had it not already used its other peremptory strikes.94 
IX.  JUDGMENTS 
Dueling judgments regarding the same real property were the subject of the 
Texas Supreme Court’s ruling in Texas Department of Transportation v. A.P.I. Pipe 
and Supply, LLC.95 In a condemnation action, the trial court originally entered 
judgment in 2003 that gave the City of Edinburg fee-simple title in certain land, 
subject to a drainage easement in favor of the Department of Transportation, 
and awarded the landowner compensation. The following year, the trial court 
entered a nunc pro tunc judgment pursuant to Rule 306a(6)96 that “purported to 
render the [original] 2003 judgment ‘null and void.’”97 In the second judgment, 
the City only received an easement, not fee-simple title. The original property 
owner then purported to sell the property to a third party pursuant to the 
second judgment. But the supreme court held that the second nunc pro tunc 
judgment was void because it went far beyond simply correcting clerical errors in 
 
 88. In re Frank Kent Motor Co., 361 S.W.3d 628, 632–33 (Tex., cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 167 
(2012)). 
 89. Id. at 631. 
 90. Id. at 632. 
 91. Id. at 631–32. 
 92. BNSF Ry. Co. v. Wipff, 408 S.W.3d 662, 664–66 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, no pet.) 
 93. Id. at 647–68; TEX. R. CIV. P. 226a. 
 94. BNSF, 408 S.W.3d at 668–69. 
 95. Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. A.P.I. Pipe & Supply, LLC, 397 S.W.3d 162, 165 (Tex. 2012). 
 96. TEX. R. CIV. P. 306a(6). 
 97. A.P.I., 397 S.W.3d at 165. 
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the original judgment.98 Therefore, any transfer of title based upon the second 
judgment was also invalid.99 
In two cases during the Survey period, the Texas Supreme Court went to 
great lengths to overturn default judgments that were attacked through a bill of 
review. In Mabon Ltd. v. Afri-Carib Enterprises, Inc.,100 the plaintiff filed suit 
alleging breach of contract. The defendant hired counsel who filed an answer 
and a special appearance. While the clerk sent notice of the trial setting to 
defendant’s counsel, the defendant did not receive such notice either directly or 
from its counsel. The attorney neither appeared for trial nor challenged the 
approximately $1.4 million post-answer default judgment entered against the 
defendant. In response to collection efforts to enforce the judgment, the 
defendant immediately hired new counsel who filed an unseccessful restricted 
appeal.101 The supreme court allowed the bill of review, finding that the 
defendant had no actual notice of the trial setting or the default judgment 
entered against it.102 As the court noted, “we have never held that a party must 
show that it diligently monitored the case status, especially after a party hires an 
attorney to represent it.”103 In short, the court seemed unwilling to penalize the 
defendant for the negligence of its first counsel where it demonstrated its 
diligence immediately upon learning of the judgment. 
Similarly, in PNS Stores, Inc. v. Rivera, the supreme court granted a bill of 
review challenging a default judgment that had been entered nine years earlier, 
finding that there was some evidence of extrinsic fraud that tolled the applicable 
four-year limitations period.104 In this dispute, the plaintiff first sued the 
defendant in a slip-and-fall case in state court in 1998. After the defendant 
removed the case to federal court, the federal court granted summary judgment 
for the defendant in 2000, but it dismissed the case without prejudice. Three 
months later (after limitations had run), the plaintiff filed a second suit 
regarding the same incident and served the defendant through its registered 
agent without notifying its counsel. The trial court then entered a default 
judgment against the defendant for approximately $1.5 million. The plaintiff 
waited six years to abstract the judgment and then another three years to 
attempt execution. By that time, the judgment was worth over $3.5 million 
dollars. Obviously suspicious of the lengthy delay, the supreme court found 
some evidence of extrinsic fraud where the plaintiff’s counsel knew, but failed to 
provide the clerk with, the defendant’s last known address, which meant the 
defendant did not receive notice of the default judgment.105 This, the court 
reasoned, was sufficient to raise a fact issue on the limitations defense.106 
Finally, in Phillips v. Bramlett, the Texas Supreme Court held that “where an 
appellate court remands a case to the trial court for entry of judgment consistent 
 
 98. Id. at 166–68. 
 99. Id. at 168. 
 100. Mabon Ltd. v. Afri-Carib Enter., Inc., 369 S.W.3d 809, 810 (Tex. 2012). 
 101. Id. at 811. 
 102. Id. at 813. 
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 104. PNS Stores, Inc. v. Rivera, 379 S.W.3d 267, 275 (Tex. 2012). 
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with [its] opinion, and the trial court is not required to admit new or additional 
evidence to enter that judgment,” post-judgment interest should accrue from the 
date of the original judgment rather than from the date of the new judgment.107 
X.  MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL 
In In re Columbia Medical Center of Las Colinas, the Texas Supreme Court 
announced the rule that when a trial court grants a motion for new trial, it must 
articulate a reasonably specific basis for doing so beyond being “in the interests 
of justice and fairness.”108 In two opinions during the Survey period, the high 
court expounded on that ruling and highlighted the challenges that trial judges 
often face in adjudicating motions for new trials. First, in In re United Scaffolding, 
Inc., the supreme court held that a trial court did not satisfy Columbia Medical 
Center’s edict when it granted a new trial based upon several grounds, the last of 
which was “in the interests of justice and fairness,” with each of the listed 
grounds separated by the phrase “and/or.”109 This phrase, the supreme court 
reasoned, left open the possibility that “in the interests of justice and fairness” 
could have been the only ground for granting a new trial, which would not be 
proper under Columbia Medical Center.110 
Second, in In re Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., the supreme court held that even 
where the trial court has properly articulated its ground for granting a new trial, 
an appellate court may nonetheless conduct its own independent review of the 
merits of that decision.111 In this wrongful death case, the plaintiff’s counsel 
inadvertently introduced certain evidence at trial that it had sought to exclude 
by a motion in limine. Thereafter, the defendant’s counsel referenced that 
evidence during both witness examinations and closing argument, correctly 
noting that the plaintiff’s counsel had already placed the evidence before the 
jury. The trial court granted a new trial, claiming that the defendant’s counsel 
had violated a limine order and referenced evidence outside the record. The 
supreme court held that while great deference is given to the trial court’s 
judgment, the record did not support this stated basis for granting a new trial, 
and it therefore granted mandamus relief.112 
Writing on the first element of the Craddock113 test for setting aside default 
judgments—i.e., “that the defendants’ failure to answer was neither intentional 
nor the result of conscious indifference”—the Texas Supreme Court reversed a 
$1.8 million default judgment in Milestone Operating, Inc. v. ExxonMobil Corp.114 
The defendant’s representative in that case testified that he did not recall being 
 
 107. Phillips v. Bramlett, 407 S.W.3d 229, 239 (Tex. 2013). 
 108. In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, 290 S.W.3d 204, 206 (Tex. 2009). 
 109. In re United Scaffolding, Inc., 377 S.W.3d 685, 687–89 (Tex. 2012). 
 110. Id. at 689. Beyond the specific holding in the case before it, the supreme court also added 
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legal writing. Id. at 689 and n.3. 
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 112. Id. at 758–59. 
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served or turning the petition over to legal counsel, as was the normal practice. 
Although plaintiff presented evidence from a witness who saw the process server 
hand-deliver service of process to the defendant’s representative, the court noted 
that the plaintiff had not controverted the representative’s testimony (nor could 
it have) that he could not recall receiving the pleadings. Likewise, plaintiff had 
not controverted the representative’s testimony detailing the normal procedure 
he observed of turning the suit over to its counsel when the company was 
served. Therefore, the court found that the defendant had not acted 
intentionally or with conscious indifference toward the suit and remanded the 
case for a trial on the merits.115 
In Sutherland v. Spencer, the Texas Supreme Court overturned a default 
judgment even where both defendants acknowledged having been served but 
simply forgot to answer.116 The plaintiff did not (and likely could not) controvert 
the defendants’ excuse that they did not answer the suit because they left the 
citations in a stack of papers on a desk at their office and were away because of 
bad weather and the Christmas holiday season. The majority held that this 
excuse was sufficient to prove that the defendants had not acted intentionally or 
with conscious indifference.117 This holding prompted a lengthy dissent that “I 
forgot” is not an acceptable excuse for late tax returns or missing homework 
assignments and should not satisfy the standard for new trial motions either.118 
XI.  DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES 
Although it arose in a criminal context, the discussion in Youkers v. State119 
regarding a judge’s use of social media should be of interest to civil trial 
practitioners as well. In this case of first impression, the Dallas Court of Appeals 
addressed whether a trial judge’s status as Facebook “friends” with a litigant 
should constitute a ground for recusal. The court of appeals noted that no rule 
or canon of ethics prohibits a judge’s use of social media, and that “judges do 
not ‘forfeit [their] right to associate with [their] friends and acquaintances nor 
[are they] condemned to live the life of a hermit.’”120 Just as a judge is not 
automatically required to recuse because she has a business relationship or 
casual friendship with a party, the mere designation of someone as a Facebook 
“friend” is insufficient to reasonably question the judge’s impartiality.121 This is 
a subject that will undoubtedly continue to arise in the recusal context, and the 
court of appeals’ approach in Youkers provides a sensible framework for 
evaluating such motions. 
 
 115. Id. at 310. 
 116. Sutherland v. Spencer, 376 S.W.3d 752, 755–56 (Tex. 2012). 
 117. Id. at 755. 
 118. Id. at 756 (Jefferson, C.J., dissenting). 
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 121. Id. at 206. 
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XII.  DISQUALIFICATION OF COUNSEL 
In re Texas Windstorm Insurance Association122 involved an unusual scenario in 
which the City of Santa Fe and its attorney sought to disqualify the opposing 
counsel because he had previously represented the city’s attorney but not the city 
itself. The City, represented by Craig Eiland, sued the Texas Windstorm 
Insurance Association (TWIA) for failure to properly pay overhead and profit on 
a Hurricane Ike claim. TWIA hired Chris Martin to defend the suit. Some 
twenty months before, however, Martin had consulted with and advised Eiland 
in connection with a similar claim against TWIA that Eiland was handling for 
Galveston County. Indeed, Eiland testified that he had sought out Martin’s 
expertise with respect to the overhead and profit issue in particular. The City 
and Eiland filed motions to disqualify Martin, which the trial court granted.123 
A divided First District Court of Appeals disagreed that sufficient ground for 
disqualification had been established, however, and conditionally granted 
mandamus relief.124 
Although the evidence was disputed, the trial court found as a factual matter 
that Martin had a prior attorney-client relationship with Eiland, and the court of 
appeals was required to accept that finding for purposes of mandamus review.125 
Nevertheless, the majority held that Martin’s representation of TWIA did not 
violate the disciplinary rule governing former-client conflicts of interest.126 The 
majority emphasized that Martin’s former client was not the City but Eiland, 
who was not a party to the case before it.127 Although the court recognized that 
the person seeking disqualification does not necessarily have to be a party-
opponent, there must still be a level of adversity between him and his former 
lawyer that justifies the presumption that the lawyer’s current representation 
posed a risk of unfair prejudice to the movant.128 In concluding that was not the 
case, the court observed that Eiland had, in his prior representation of 
Galveston County, already disclosed to TWIA the substance of the arguments 
about overhead and profit that Martin had suggested to him.129 In sum, the 
majority found that the only real “risk to Eiland is that opposing counsel will be 
vigorously advancing arguments against his clients in these cases, which is a 
situation in every adversarial lawsuit and is not the concern of Rule 1.09.”130 
The majority also concluded that the two matters were not substantially 
related, even accepting the trial court’s factual finding that Martin had obtained 
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confidential information about Eiland’s handling of Hurricane Ike cases 
through his prior representation.131 Specifically, the opinion notes again that 
Eiland himself was not asserting a claim against TWIA, and there was no 
evidence that the “lawyer-to-lawyer consultation” was specifically related to the 
City’s claims against TWIA.132 And even though the two matters had issues in 
common, such as the overhead and profit issue and the substantive claim, that 
did not compel disqualification in the absence of evidence that the underlying 
facts were sufficiently similar.133 
In a lengthy dissent, Justice Terry Jennings took the majority to task for 
substituting its factual determinations for those of the trial judge who heard all 
of the evidence over the course of a five-day hearing.134 The dissent argued that 
whether matters are substantially related is a “fact-intensive inquiry of whether ‘a 
lawyer could have acquired confidential information concerning a prior client 
that could be used either to that prior client’s disadvantage or for the advantage 
of the lawyer’s current client or some other person.’”135 Given the trial judge’s 
finding, which was supported by competent evidence, that Martin had in fact 
obtained confidential information about Eiland’s negotiation and litigation 
strategies for these claims, the dissent reasonably questioned how the majority 
could find an abuse of discretion.136 Rather than strictly adhering to the 
standards for mandamus review, therefore, it appears the majority was trying to 
erect a bulwark against a wave of future disqualification motions based on these 
types of lawyer-to-lawyer consultations.137 
XIII.  MISCELLANEOUS 
In In re Service Corp. International,138 the Texas Supreme Court had the 
opportunity to determine when it is appropriate for a trial court to appoint an 
arbitrator. After the defendant answered and asserted that the dispute was 
subject to a mandatory arbitration agreement, the parties were unable to agree 
on an arbitrator. The plaintiff asked the court to appoint an arbitrator, claiming 
that the defendant had waived its right to seek an appointment by the American 
Arbitration Association (AAA). The trial court agreed and selected an arbitrator. 
The defendant then filed a petition for writ of mandamus. 
The parties agreed that the dispute was governed by Section 5 of the Federal 
Arbitration Act, which provides that the court shall designate the arbitrator if 
any party fails to avail itself of a contractually agreed-upon method for selecting 
an arbitrator.139 In this case, the arbitration contract provided: “[T]he arbitrator 
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shall be selected by mutual agreement of the parties. If the parties fail to or are 
unable to agree on the selection of an appropriate arbitrator, the AAA shall 
select the arbitrator pursuant to its rules and procedures upon the application of 
one or both parties.”140 
The arbitration agreement therefore set forth only two ways for the parties to 
select an arbitrator: (1) mutual agreement; or (2) if the parties cannot agree, the 
AAA selects the arbitrator. Thus, the supreme court analyzed whether one or 
both of the parties “failed to avail” itself of the agreed-upon arbitrator selection 
method or if there was a “lapse” in the selection of an arbitrator. The supreme 
court held that these exceptions in Section 5 should only be invoked by the trial 
court when there is some “mechanical breakdown in the arbitrator selection 
process” or if “one of the parties refuses to comply, thereby delaying arbitration 
indefinitely.”141 In this case, the court found that a seven month delay did not 
qualify as either a lapse or failure to avail because it included the period in 
which the parties tried to reach agreement and did in fact agree on an arbitrator, 
“only to have him recused” because of a conflict of interest.142 The trial court 
selected an arbitrator only one month after the agreed-upon arbitrator had been 
disqualified. Under these circumstances, the court determined that the trial 
court had abused its discretion in not allowing the AAA the opportunity to 
select the arbitrator.143 
In Ellman v. JC General Contractors,144 the El Paso Court of Appeals found that 
the defendants had substantially invoked the judicial process so as to waive their 
right to arbitration. In January 2009, the plaintiff filed its original petition. A 
few days later, the defendants answered, raising special exceptions and 
affirmative defenses, and asserted counterclaims for breach of contract, fraud, 
breach of warranty, and declaratory judgment. The parties engaged in extensive 
discovery, and the trial court set the case for trial on July 12, 2010. On June 7, 
2010, the parties filed a joint motion for continuance on the ground they would 
not be ready for trial and needed to conduct additional discovery. The trial 
court granted the joint motion for continuance, and for the next eight months, 
the parties engaged in additional discovery. In February 2011, the trial court 
entered an order setting a pretrial conference on December 14, 2011, and a jury 
trial on January 23, 2012. The trial court also ordered the parties to mediation. 
The parties continued to engage in discovery and the defendants prepared and 
filed pretrial materials. Finally, “on October 11, 2011, thirty-five months after 
filing suit, and approximately three and one-half months before the trial 
setting,” defendants asserted a demand for arbitration.145 After making this 
demand, however, defendants continued to take depositions and filed a motion 
to compel discovery in addition to their motion to compel arbitration. 
The court of appeals first noted that the plaintiff faced a very high burden to 
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demonstrate that the defendants had substantially invoked the judicial process 
to the plaintiff’s prejudice. The court then reviewed several cases where, despite 
significant litigation activity, the Texas courts found no waiver of a party’s right 
to arbitration.146 In this case, however, the court found that the defendant had 
substantially invoked the judicial process and waived its right to arbitration 
because of the considerable delay, expense, and damage to the plaintiff’s legal 
position.147 Moreover, the court found that the plaintiff had been prejudiced 
because it had revealed its entire legal strategy during the pendency of the 
litigation.148 
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